Obama's quest for a Pakistan policy
November 5, 2009
By Mushahid Hussain
Hillary Clinton's visit with a difference was probably the most significant
event in Pakistan-American relations since the advent of President Barack
Hussein Obama. She came, she saw, but while she did not quite conquer the
"hearts and minds" of Pakistanis, Hillary at least earned their grudging
admiration. She showed more guts than the bunkered-up Pakistan rulers, who
refuse to leave the comfort and safety of their "5-star prisons" in Islamabad.
Unlike the aloof and abrasive Holbrooke, Hillary reached out to the "real"
Pakistan. She got a peep into the emerging Pakistani society -- dynamic,
vibrant, outspoken and self-confident. She seemed taken aback, used as visiting
high-level Americans are to a sanitised Islamabad, where the
officially-certified truth of the fawning ruling elite links sycophancy and
servility to their self-perpetuation.
A profile of this "new" Pakistan is instructive, with three key ingredients.
First, while the "old" Pakistan was politically a "one-window operation" --
monolithic and centrally-guided -- today's multiple power centres go beyond the
military-security Establishment or the traditional political elite, and these
now include the fiercely-independent media, an assertive civil society,
confident young men and women with faith in their country's future, and a free
judiciary that for the first time is truly an autonomous player.
Second, in contrast to the "old" Pakistan where the political elite was united
in its belief that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington, the "new"
Pakistan has little time for 'business-as-usual' political shenanigans, an
absence of fear of power and authority, and no "Holy Cows."
Third, there is a broad popular consensus woven around a rejection of the
mediaeval mindset and terrorism of the extremists, the corruption and
capitulation of the ruling elite, and the hubris and diktat emanating from
Washington.
While Pakistan's fourth flirtation with the United States goes through its
predictable course of romance-disillusionment-distance, there is some good news
and bad news regarding Washington's Afghanistan policy. First, the good news.
Unlike Lyndon Johnson and George W Bush, Barack Hussein Obama is not allowing
his generals to lead him to "Vietnamistan," as critics are calling the
escalation in Afghanistan. As seven meetings of his "war council" demonstrate,
Obama has bid goodbye to the non-starter that was his "Af-Pak" strategy. The
smart politician that he is, Obama would not want his presidency to sink in the
mountains of the Hindukush, hence the "review and reflect" mould.
But the bad news is that the Obama administration remains clueless on Pakistan
and Afghanistan. They know what they don't want to do -- not escalate to such an
extent that the US will end up facing another quagmire. But they still don't
know what they should be doing or how to go about it.
After "Afpak" is dead and hopefully buried, here's what Pakistan should tell
Washington on how to go about a doable strategy:
-- Trust Pakistan as an ally, and treat Pakistanis with the respect and dignity
they deserve. After all, they have the highest stakes and suffered the most as
the "eye of the storm" since the 30-year unrelenting war in Afghanistan
(attempts at encouraging a civil-military divide amongst "good" and "bad"
Pakistanis won't work);
-- Don't make Afghan policy hostage to a failed and flawed ruler in Kabul, who
neither has credibility nor any legitimacy. Cobble together a government of
national unity in Afghanistan, and do it quickly. Karzai today is just another
Babrak Karmal;
-- Stop treating terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan as only a "Pakhtun
problem." The Pakhtuns, on either side of the Durand Line, are suffering the
most. They have faced death, destruction and displacement with fortitude. The
Pakhtuns are the most hardworking of the ethnic groups living in Pakistan, with
a deeply democratic and egalitarian ethos. During a conference at NATO
headquarters in July 2007, Khalid Pashtoon, an Afghan MP from Kandahar, told the
gathering that notwithstanding tall clams of expansion of the Afghan National
Army (ANA), representation of Pakhtuns from the troubled southeastern
Afghanistan in the ANA was still less than 1 percent;
-- Remember, the road to stability in Kabul now lies through Pakistan, so its
security and strengthening should be paramount, not the other way around.
Pakistan, with a functioning, modern, state infrastructure, is doable with
greater intelligence coordination and fashioning of a fresh, comprehensive
counter-terrorism strategy, which the country still lacks. American-style
"nation-building" in Afghanistan is not doable.
"Af-Pak" lies buried for a combination of reasons. It was cobbled together in a
hurry based on certain assumptions, notably a distrust of Pakistan
military-security establishment's intentions regarding extremism, and confidence
in the Kabul administration's ability to serve as an anchor of US political
strategy in Afghanistan. Both have been disproved by subsequent developments.
Much has happened in the region since then. Pakistanis have demonstrated
unprecedented resolve, unity and determination to protect the vision of their
Founding Fathers regarding their country, as the successful military operations
in Swat-Malakand and South Waziristan demonstrate. The US now has no political
prop to its military strategy, especially after the disastrous election fiasco
in Afghanistan.
There has been the first official interaction between the Indian government and
the ISI, and a softening of the Indian stance on Kashmir, with a renewed
willingness to "talk to all, without preconditions." This change of heart in New
Delhi is partly premised on a fear of the resurgent Maoists (who now influence
20 of India's 29 states) and on the fiery polemics between China and India, the
first such strident exchange in 30 years.
For the future, three core areas of distrust and conflict remain in
Pakistani-American relations. And unless these are resolved by the Obama
administration, neither the bilateral relationship nor any US strategy in
Afghanistan will succeed.
First, the two sides view their enemies differently -- the US does not view our
enemies within as their foes nor do we view their adversaries in Afghanistan as
our threats. Hence, a mutual lack of cooperation in tackling each other's
enemies, whose most recent manifestation was the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan
timing the closure of check posts on their side with the Pakistan strike in
Waziristan.
Second, India and its role in Afghanistan are viewed differently in Islamabad
and Washington, with the latter brushing aside Pakistani concerns and taking no
interest or measures to stop the growing proxy war between the two rivals in
Afghanistan.
Third, the US views the Pakistan military and security services essentially in
an adversarial light, to be contained, controlled and "cut down to size."
Washington conveniently overlooks the fact that the main threat to the
democratic dispensation is not from any budding Bonapartists waiting in the
wings, but from the same reasons – "bad governance and increasing corruption" --
that Obama mentioned in his stern phone call to Karzai on Nov 2. These issues,
vital for Pakistan's stability and democracy, were in the original Biden-Lugar
bill, but are strangely missing from the final legislation, for reasons best
known to Washington.
Irrespective of what Obama decides for Afghanistan, the Pakistani state is
already in the process of reinventing itself, a process that has been hurt by US
ignorance and arrogance regarding its much-maligned ally. The challenge for
Obama is to fashion a Pakistan policy that matches the new realities in the
region, rather than reflecting an old, outmoded mindset.
The writer is a senator and senior political analyst. Email:
mushahid.hussain@gmail.com
http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=206801
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